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Media, Information, and Consumer Choice (Jill McCluskey, Washington
State Universtiy, presiding)
WHO DO CONSUMERS TRUST FOR INFORMATION:
THE CASE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS?
WALLACE E. HUFFMAN, MATTHEW ROUSU, JASON F. SHOGREN,
AND ABEBAYEHU TEGENE
During the twentieth century, research and
development (R&D) has produced a steady
stream of inventions and new consumer goods,
many of which have been adopted and proven
to be the source of a rising standard of living
(Boskin et al.). The introduction of new goods,
however, creates a disequilibrium (Hausman),
which in turn creates a demand by eco-
nomic agents for objective information to as-
sist in making decisions on adoption and use
(Schultz).1 The consumer’s challenge is to sort
through the various, competing and sometimes
conflicting, sources of information.
Consider, for example, the controversial
products—genetically modified (GM) foods.
The agricultural biotechnology firms (e.g.,
Monsanto, Syngenta, and the industry’s Coun-
cil on Biotechnology Information) have hailed
the use of biotechnology to create new prod-
ucts as a major revolution in product innova-
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1 The appearance of new goods (or new attributes) has the same
effect that the appearance of a new means of production has on a
firm (Bianchi; Becker 1976, pp. 131–149).
tion (Hoban 1997, 2001). They have dissemi-
nated information claiming that GM crops will
lower food costs worldwide and improve envi-
ronmental quality. The council has even cre-
ated and distributed children’s coloring books
that promote the positive aspects of GM foods.
In contrast, two international environmen-
tal NGOs, Greenpeace and Friends of the
Earth, have distributed negative information
through web sites, press releases, and demon-
strated claiming risks to human health, en-
vironment, and biodiversity. They also claim
that consumers have the right to know with
respect to GM labeling, and that new technol-
ogy benefits only large multinationals and not
consumers (Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace
International 1997). The federal government
also supplies information on genetic modifi-
cation. In 1992, the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) issued a statement saying that
GM foods do not have to be labeled if the new
product has the same characteristics as its non-
GM counterpart (FDA 1992). If, however, a
new vitamin was introduced into a food crop
using genetic modification, the food product
would have to be labeled (FDA 2001). In con-
trast, Australia, China, European Union (EU),
Mexico, New Zealand, and Russia have
mandatory labeling policies for GM foods. In
2004, the EU removed a four-year moratorium
on approvals of GM crops, but in April it im-
plemented traceability requirement for food
and feed.
In principle, society can recapture some
of the losses from diverse information dis-
seminated by interested parties if decision
makers have access to independent, third-
party information. For example, see the dis-
cussion of verifiable information in Milgrom
and Roberts and Huffman and Tegene. In re-
cent research, Huffman et al. have defined
Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86 (Number 5, 2004): 1222–1229
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verifiable information for genetic modification
as information that is from a knowledgeable
independent, third-party source that has no
significant financial ties to the agricultural
biotechnology industry. Although government
agencies provide information, we do not claim
that federal government agencies present an
independent, third-party perspective. Federal
regulatory agencies do not have the resources
required to engage in significant independent
research, and they must rely heavily upon the
firms that they regulate to provide them the in-
formation they use to make recommendations.
Although biotech firms are not always pleased
with decisions made by the FDA, USDA, or
EPA, the international NGOs believe that
these agencies have a decidedly probiotech
perspective (Greenpeace International 1997,
2002; Gates). Also, elected government offi-
cials may receive campaign contributions from
interested parties who are hoping to obtain fu-
ture favorable treatment. Consequently, Huff-
man and Tegene have proposed that a quasi-
governmental agency, that is funded, perhaps
by the federal government, but not controlled
by government officials, would be the most
credible source of independent, third-party in-
formation on genetic modification. Rousu et
al. have concluded that verifiable information
on GM food products can have an annual value
to U.S. consumers of over $2 billion annually.
Interested and disinterested parties dissem-
inate information with the goal of affecting
consumers’ (and producers’) decisions on GM
technology and other products. However, for
these groups to be influential, they must gar-
ner “trust.” Recent evidence by Glaeser et al.
shows that individuals who are closer in so-
cial status or who have similar personal capital
(PC) are more likely to trust one another. For
example, individuals who were raised with a
particular religious tradition place more trust
in others who were raised within the same reli-
gious tradition, ceteris paribus. More generally,
Becker (1996) argues that consumer’s social
captial (SC) and PC are important determi-
nants of his/her tastes or preferences. Social
capital is defined as the capital the individual
acquires through his or her surroundings, up-
bringing, and social network. Personal/human
capital is defined as capital that the individual
personally acquires, such as, schooling, habits,
or experience. Becker shows when PC and
SC are incorporated into economic models,
economic theory can explain many previously
puzzling outcomes such as the effect of adver-
tising on consumers’ purchasing behavior and
human addictions.
Understanding the formation of trust in in-
formation sources is an important step in un-
derstanding consumers’ preferences for infor-
mation on new products. With the aid of a
model, we formulate hypotheses about the role
of measurable attributes of a consumer, which
are related to his or her household income, PC
and SC, and prior beliefs in the formation of
trust. For this study, unique data were collected
by an independent agency from a random sam-
ple of adults chosen from two major Midwest-
ern cities.2 These individuals were paid $40
to come to a central location, to provide so-
ciodemographic information and information
on prior beliefs about technologies, and to par-
ticipate in a set of experiments (as explained in
detail in a companion paper, Huffman et al.).
At the end of the experiments, they were asked
to complete a short questionnaire including the
following question: “If a source of informa-
tion were to give you verifiable information on
GM foods, who would you trust most?” This
information was coded into six different cate-
gories: third party, government, environmental
or consumer group, private industry or organi-
zation, none or nobody, and “other” (includ-
ing no response). A multinomial logit model is
fitted to the sample of postexperiment partici-
pants to explain their relative trust in sources
to provide verifiable information on GM foods.
We find an individual’s household income
has no significant effect on relative trust, but
an increase in his or her schooling lowers the
probability of trusting information from gov-
ernment, private industry or organizations, en-
vironmental or consumer groups, or “other”
sources relative to information from an in-
dependent third-party source. Older individ-
uals have significantly lower odds of trusting
“nobody” for GM information relative to an
independent, third-party source. People who
claimed to be informed about genetic mod-
ification before the experiments were more
likely to trust the government than the third-
party sources. People who had a conserva-
tive religious upbringing had a lower odds of
2 A telephone interview of a random sample of adults is an alter-
native route to obtaining observations and data. See for example,
Johnston et al. who undertake a contingent-choice telephone sur-
vey of a national sample of households. Contingent valuation has
the well-known shortcoming of asking only “hypothetical ques-
tions” rather than budget-constrained questions. Our laboratory
auction market required participants to “pay” what they “say,”
that is, bids are real. Because of major costs of getting participants
to a laboratory location and setting up experiments and paying
participants, a laboratory auction can be conducted in only few
locations and with a modest number of participants. We have a
total of 318 individuals participant, which large by experimental
economics standards.
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trusting private industry or organizations and
a higher odds of trusting “nobody” relative to
an independent, third-party source. This arti-
cle has five sections.
(8)
MUpl(·)
(
J∑
j=1
∂MUl(·)
∂ f j
∂ f j
∂PC
)
− MUl(·)
(
J∑
j=1
∂MU pl(·)
∂ f j
∂ f j
∂PC
)
[MU pl(·)]2 .
Model
Following Becker (1996), consider the strictly
quasi-concave utility function shown as:
U = U(Xl , X pl ; T1, . . . , Tj ).(1)
Utility is based on the consumption of two
choice variables: foods labeled as GM (Xl) and
foods that have a plain label (Xpl). The utility of
these two goods is hypothesized to be affected
by information from j sources. This informa-
tion differs in quality for each type (i.e., level
of trust). Assume information quality or trust
in the jth type is a function of the consumer’s
PC and SC:
Tj = f j (SC, PC).(2)
The market price for foods labeled as GM is
pl and the price of plain-labeled foods is ppl.
At time t, the consumer maximizes his or her
utility, subject to the budget constraint M, and
stock of PC and SC:
maxU(Xl , Xpl , T1, . . . , TJ ),
Tj = f j (SC, PC) s.t. pl Xl
+ ppl X pl ≤ M.
(3)
The first-order conditions are as follows:
MUl (Xl , X pl ; T1, . . . , TJ ) − pl = 0(4)
MUnl (Xl , X pl ; T1, . . . , TJ ) − ppl = 0(5)
pl Xl + ppl X pl − M = 0.(6)
Equations (5) and (6) can be rearranged to
show the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween GM- and plain-labeled foods, as shown
in equation (7):
MUl (Xl , X pl ; T1, . . . , TJ )
MUpl (Xl , X pl ; T1, . . . , TJ )
= pl
ppl
.(7)
A consumer’s marginal rate of substitution be-
tween GM- and plain-labeled foods is a func-
tion of the relative prices of the goods and PC
and SC, which influences the trust for the j
providers of information. By moving the ratio
of prices to the left-hand side, we can differ-
entiate with respect to PC or SC. Consider the
equation below, which examines the impact of
a change in a consumer’s PC for the two goods:
A change in PC seems likely to have differ-
ential impacts across the j information quality
types and is not neutral on the marginal rate
of substitution between GM- and plain-labeled
foods. To simplify the analysis and without
loss of generality, assume a change in Tj,
j = 1, . . . , J, does not impact the marginal util-
ity for plain-labeled (non-GM) foods. Then,
equation (8) becomes
MUpl(·)
(
J∑
j=1
∂MUl(·)
∂fj
∂fj
∂PC
)
[MU pl(·)]2
.(9)
Now if an increase in an individual’s PC re-
duces his or her trust in agri-business infor-
mation which then lowers his or her marginal
utility of GM-labeled food, this causes the con-
sumer’s marginal rate of substitution between
GM- and plain-labeled foods to decrease.
Hence, the consumer will purchase more plain-
labeled foods at given relative prices. This ex-
ample illustrates that, when an individual’s PC
(or SC) changes his or her trust in an interested
party (by changing the perceived quality of the
information), it can affect consumer’s demand
for GM- and plain-labeled foods.
The Survey
The participants in our postexperiment survey
were adult consumers over eighteen years of
age chosen by a random digit-dialing method
from two major Midwestern metropolitan ar-
eas (Tegene et al.). Three hundred eighteen
individuals participated in our project out of
1,673 contacted, which was a response rate
of approximately 19%. When individuals ar-
rived at the lab site, they were asked to com-
plete a preauction questionnaire giving so-
ciodemographic information and information
about prior knowledge on GM technology.
After the laboratory experiments were com-
pleted, they then completed a postauction
questionnaire. This questionnaire included the
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Table 1. Attributes of the Sample (N = 318)
Number Percentage
Panel A. “Who Individuals Trust for Information on Genetic Modification”
All 318 100
Third party including university, scientists/researchers 94 29.6
Government 62 19.5
Environmental or consumer group 12 3.8
Private industry or organization 16 5
None or nobody 19 6
Other, media, or no answer 115 36.1
Variables Definition Mean SD
Panel B. Attributes of Participants
Income household’s annual income ($1,000) 54.70 34.10
Education years of form schooling completed 14.50 4.50
Age the participant’s age 50.10 17.50
Gender 1 if female, and 0 for male 0.62 0.49
Informed 1 if participant considered him/herself at least 0.48 0.44
somewhat about GM preexperiment
Religion 1 if conservative religious upbringing 0.59 0.25
question: “If a source were to give you veri-
fiable information on GM foods, who would
you trust most?”3 This was an open-ended
question, and participants wrote their answer
down on the questionnaire. “We then arbitrar-
ily coded the responses into six categories”:
government; university, scientists/researchers,
or third-party groups; environmental or con-
sumer group; private industry or organiza-
tion; none or nobody; and “other,” including
media.
The first category is independent third-party
sources. It contains responses from individuals
who would most trust universities, scientists,
or an independent third-party group that does
not have financial ties to genetic modification.
The second category “government” contains
responses from individuals who named a gov-
ernment (national, state, or local) or a govern-
mental entity (e.g., FDA). The third category
“environmental or consumer group” is for par-
ticipants who indicated they would most trust
an environmental or a consumer group to pro-
vide verifiable information on GM foods. The
fourth category is “private industry or organi-
zations,” which contains the response for any
individual who listed a private entity or busi-
ness as the group they would trust most. Most
of these responses were for agri-business firms
or grocery stores. The fifth category is “none or
3 To see the format of these experiments, see Huffman et al. or
Tegene et al.
no body” and it is for individuals who said they
would not trust any source. The last category is
classified as “other,” and it contains responses
by individuals who would trust the media, and
some responses that were too sparse for their
own category (e.g., one person said he or she
most trusted God to provide verifiable infor-
mation on GM foods).
Excluding the “other” category, the most
frequently reported trusted source for in-
formation on genetic modification the first
group, “third-party including university, scien-
tists/researches,” accounting for 30% of the re-
sponses (see table 1, panel A). The “govern-
ment” was listed by 20% of the respondents.
The “environmental or consumer group,” “pri-
vate industry or organizations,” and “none”
each received less than 6% of the responses.
The media is included in a residual category
that includes “other” preferences.
Although the demographics of our sample
do not perfectly match the U.S. Census demo-
graphic characteristics for these regions, they
are similar and provide a sufficient represen-
tation to examine which consumers trust for
information on GM foods (see Tegene et al.).
Our participants were slightly skewed toward
women, but Katsaras et al. show that women
make up a disproportional share of grocery
shoppers—83% of shoppers versus 52% in the
U.S. Census of Population.
Personal capital is proxied by an individual’s
education, age, and prior knowledge about
GM technology. An individual’s education not
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only affects his or her opportunity cost of his
or her time, but also his or her ability to ac-
quire and process information, to make deci-
sions (Schultz, Huffman), and formulate trust.
Twenty-five percent of the participants had not
gone beyond high school. About 39% of the
participants had completed four or more years
of college.
An individual’s age is a proxy for years of ex-
perience as a decision maker, which is expected
to affect the formation of trust, and also an in-
dicator of length of expected remaining length
of life. As an individual becomes older, he or
she has fewer expected years over which to ob-
tain benefits from acquired information.
If a participant is “informed” about genetic
modification before the experiment, this may
affect his or her preferences for information
sources. Being “Informed” is represented as
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the re-
spondent perceives him or herself as being
“at least somewhat informed regarding GM
foods.”
Religious upbringing is a form of SC, and,
hence, could play a role in trust formation.
Our survey asked people to indicate their re-
ligious affiliation when they were young. Fif-
teen percent of the participants were raised
as Baptists, slightly more than 26% of par-
ticipants were raised as Catholics, and about
17% were raised as Lutherans. Forty-seven
percent had other affiliations. Individuals were
designated as having a “conservative” reli-
gious upbringing relative to “trust” in infor-
mation sources for GM food if they were
raised as Baptists, Catholic, or Lutheran. These
three religions have among the strictest re-
ligious upbringings on the origin of life. See
panel B of table 1 for sample means of these
variables.
Econometric Model
Consider a random indirect utility model in
which the utility of a consumer’s choice j is de-
termined by xj, consumer’s household income,
goods’ prices, and attributes:
Ui j = ′xi j + εi j .(10)
The utility of consumer i is based on informa-
tion choice j ∈ J. If he or she chooses j, it must
be the one yielding the highest utility. When
disturbance terms are independently and iden-
tically distributed Weibull, the probability of
consumer i choosing source j is
Prob(Yi = j) = e′j xi
/
J∑
k=1
e
′
k xii
for j = 0, 1, . . . , J.
(11)
Equation (11) is the multinomial logit model
(see Greene, p. 720–22). To solve the model,
however, one must first define ∗j = j + q, for
a vector q, and then normalize 0 = 0.4 The
probability of choosing source j is then
Prob(Y = j) = e′j xi
/(
1 +
J∑
k=1
e
′
k xii
)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , J
(12)
Prob(Y = 0) = 1
/(
1 +
J∑
k=1
e
′
k xii
)
.(13)
We can represent the probability a consumer
prefers source j (j = 1, . . . , J) as the log-odds
ratios:
ln (Pi j/Pi0) = ′j xi .(14)
Equation (14) shows the probability that a
consumer prefers (trust) source j over choice
0, the reference choice.5 If ′j is positive, then
a marginal increase in xi increases the odds
that the consumer prefers source j over the
reference source 0, which is the “independent
third-party source.” The regressors are vari-
ables proxying an individual’s PC and SC, his
or her beliefs, and his or her household income.
Econometric Results
The fitted model provides empirical evidence
for the odds that a consumer trusts one of the
five sources of information more or less than
he or she trusts an “independent third-party
source” to provide verifiable information on
GM foods. Five regressors were included in
this multinomial logit model: a participant’s
household income, education, age (which can
be thought of as a proxy for experience), a
4 This arises because the alternatives are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive and the associated probabilities sum to 1. Only J pa-
rameter vectors are needed to determine the (J + 1) probabilities.
5 From the point of view of estimation, it is a major advantage
that the odds ratio does not depend on the other choices, which fol-
lows from the independence of disturbances in the original model.
From a behavioral viewpoint, however, this fact is not so attractive.
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Table 2. Estimates of Multinomial Logit Model: Who Would You Trust to Provide Verifiable
Information on Genetically Modified Foods? (N = 318)
Government/ Env. or Con. Private Ind. or Nobody/ Other/
Variable Third Party Group/Third Party Org./Third Party Third Party Third Party
Intercept 1.169 −1.658 2.369 4.043∗ 5.568∗∗∗
(1.286) (2.420) (2.172) (1.810) (1.141)
Household income −0.0010 −0.0099 0.0076 −0.0100 0.0017
(0.0052) (0.0110) (0.0085) (0.0096) (0.0046)
Education −0.138∗ 0.081 −0.347∗∗ −0.242∗ −0.389∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.149) (0.147) (0.124) (0.074)
Age 0.010 −0.025 0.001 −0.035∗∗ 0.004
(0.010) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.009)
Informed 0.344∗∗ 0.442 0.003 0.050 0.158
(0.170) (0.328) (0.286) (0.269) (0.149)
Religious upbringing −0.042 0.055 −0.840∗∗ 0.556∗∗ −0.074
(0.171) (0.316) (0.399) (0.280) (0.151)
∗Indicates that an estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level.
∗∗At the 5% significance level.
∗∗∗At the 1% level.
Note: The reference group is an independent, third-party source, and standard errors are in parentheses.
dummy variable for prior beliefs, and a dummy
for conservative religious affiliation.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the
coefficients for the multinomial logit model
for an individual’s relative trust in informa-
tion sources are reported in table 2. The inde-
pendent variables are listed on the far-left col-
umn in table 2, while the information sources
are listed along the top. Increasing a partic-
ipant’s household income did not change the
odds of choosing any of the five sources relative
to third-party information, and hence, was ex-
cluded in the final fitting. Income may increase
the demand for information of all types equally
(or not at all). An individual who is well edu-
cated is shown to more likely to trust an “in-
dependent third-party” source relative to the
other five sources. Also, increasing a partici-
pant’s schooling lowers significantly the odds
that he or she trusts government, private indus-
try or organization sources, or no “body”, and
“other” relative to a third-party source. Edu-
cation has no significant effect on the choice of
environmental or consumer sources relative to
a third-party source.
As an individual ages, the odds he or she
trusts an environmental or a consumer group
or “nobody” falls significantly relative to trust-
ing a third-party source. His or her age, how-
ever, has positive effect on the odds of trusting
government, private industry or organization,
or other relative to a third-party source. These
effects, however, are statistically weak. If a
participant reported in the preauction ques-
tionnaire that he or she was “informed about
genetically modified foods,” he or she is sig-
nificantly more likely to trust the government
relative to a third-party source. If a participant
had a strict religious upbringing, he or she has
significantly lower odds of trusting private in-
dustry or organization and higher odds of trust-
ing “nobody” relative to a third-party source.
The person’s religious upbringing, however,
did not have a significant effect on the odds of
any of the other choices relative to third-party
information.6
Conclusion and Implications
Although many organizations disseminate in-
formation on a wide range of topics, they
must gain the trust of a constituent group
before they can affect decisions. In the case
of GM foods, the international environmen-
tal NGOs and agricultural biotech industry
disseminate conflicting information. Interna-
tional environmental NGOs disseminate neg-
ative information; agricultural biotech indus-
try disseminates positive information. In fact,
the international environmental NGOs, agri-
cultural biotechnology industry, and U.S. gov-
ernment all have different interpretations of
the role of GM foods should play in our so-
ciety. Hence, the federal government is not
a valid third-party source, for example, some
groups are not in favor of the FDA policies
6 Multinomial logit models including a participant’s gender and
marital status were also fitted. These variables did not have esti-
mated coefficients that were statistically different from zero at the
5% significance level.
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on voluntary GM food labels, but a quasi-
governmental entity funded by the govern-
ment and staffed with informed but finan-
cially disinterested scientists not answering
to the government may be the best possible
source to provide information on foods labeled
as GM.
Although the literature on the economics of
trust is growing rapidly, few studies have ex-
amined the contribution of an individual’s PC
and SC to his or her trust. This article has pro-
vided new econometric evidence that PC and
SC of adults who are consumers affect signifi-
cantly their trust in five different sources of in-
formation on genetic modification relative to
an independent, third-party source. We have
shown that an individual’s PC—schooling, age,
religion, and self-reporting status as being in-
formed about GM foods—and SC in religious
affiliation contributed significantly to explain-
ing the odds of particular information source
preferences.
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